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Abstract 
This article investigates the socio-economic causes that have led to the recent political 
instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The MENA region is 
characterised as one which holds massive hydrocarbon resources and yet suffers from low 
economic growth and development and high levels of unemployment. This article shows that 
the Arab uprisings are linked to the inequalities created by the opening up of the Arab 
countries to foreign capital and financial agencies, a project that is commonly referred to as 
Washington Consensus. This neo-liberal globalisation programme has been highly diverse in 
its effectiveness throughout the MENA region. However the state still remains the dominant 
economic player in this region and the Arab population still regards it as the primary 
provider. The state has been able to hold on to its power by limiting the role of private 
enterprise and also by maintaining an exclusive nexus between itself and the few prominent 
private sector companies. Although the wave of disillusionment and frustration amongst the 
Arab youth washed over the entire region with the same passion and propensity, the 
reaction of individual governments has been very varied. The future of the region lies in how 
effectively and efficiently the interim or newly elected governments are able to move their 
country beyond the pincers of, on the one hand, the Washington Consensus and, on the 
other, the old, state-centric and inefficient developmental regime.  
 
Introduction 
The current political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has brought 
‘democratisation’ and ‘economic liberalisation’ to the forefront of political debate. The 
dramatic political developments since December 2010 have created uncertainty over future 
economic policy and reform in the MENA region1. Transitional governments in countries 
affected by the Arab Spring are working on a mandate to deliver greater political and 
economic accountability and transparency to ensure sustainable macroeconomic growth and 
political stability. There is still a considerable amount of uncertainty and debate as to 
whether the Arab nations that had embarked on market driven economic reform in the 
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1990s, in line with the Washington Consensus, will continue on the same path or if the 
political transition triggered by the Arab Spring will force them to take an alternative route to 
economic growth. Furthermore, although the Arab Spring provides an unprecedented 
opportunity for political, economic and social reform in the long term its immediate impact 
has been devastating, characterised by social unrest, sectarian violence, massive 
displacement of communities and deterioration of living standards in general2.  
The countries belonging to the MENA region are hugely diverse at multiple levels such as 
history, population size, resources, policy and ideological orientation however they have 
several unifying characteristics3. First, they all have similar demographic profiles 
characterised by a disproportionately large youth population – ‘youth bulge’. The median age 
in Arab countries is 25, the second lowest in the world, with only Sub–Saharan African 
countries being younger4. Second, all countries within the MENA region have a dominant 
public sector. Third, the main source of revenue for these countries comes from rents 
derived from oil and other hydrocarbons, international aid or remittances from abroad. 
Fourth, political power in these countries is concentrated in the hands of few, inasmuch as a 
robust civil society is absent and Islam plays an important role in the articulation between the 
public and the private sphere. The Arab uprisings have had very wide ranging impact in the 
region with some governments resorting to appeasement through increased subsidies and 
welfare and political reform while in a handful of countries the political elite have taken an 
extreme hard-line stance to remain in power.   
Over the past few decades, the economic development strategies adopted by the MENA 
countries follow a path similar to most developing countries. From the 1950s to the mid-
1980s the development strategy comprised of Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) 
policies which included strict controls on international trade, overvalued exchange rates and 
government controlled foreign exchange and credit markets5. The objective of such a 
strategy was to develop capital intensive domestic industry producing goods and services in 
a highly protected business environment for domestic market consumption. This strategy 
resulted in the proliferation of large state owned companies operating in uncompetitive and 
inefficient markets. The private sector benefitted from government subsidies in the form of 
discounted prices of intermediate goods, cheap credit foreign exchange and import licenses. 
Overall, the result was as an economic system where the state was the dominant player and 
private sector was virtually non-existent. During this period the economic performance 
across countries in this region was mainly influenced by volatile oil prices. The hike in oil 
prices in 1973 and 1979 led to rapid improvements in growth and development indicators 
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within this region. The collapse of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s has led to significant 
reversal in economic growth and prosperity.  Since the 1990s many MENA countries have 
embraced market-led, outward looking economic reform by adopting the structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP) introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. These reforms were based on the neo-liberal policies prescribed in the 
Washington consensus which encouraged trade liberalisation, fiscal discipline and private-
sector driven growth.  
The objective of the paper is to review the recent economic developments and prospects of 
the MENA region in light of the policies outlined in the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the 
implications of the Arab uprising on short term economic performance and policy. The paper 
is divided into three sections. The first section defines the Washington Consensus, focussing 
on global impact of policy reforms and the ‘post Washington Consensus’, which was an 
effort to address inadequacies of neo-liberal globalisation innate in the term. The second 
section is a review of the economic performance and development of the MENA region 
before the Arab uprising in 2010 and how successfully countries within this region were able 
to adopt and implement the Washington Consensus policies. The third section links up the 
impact of reforms, driven by the neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus, upon 
social classes and categories, thus deciphering the cause of the Arab Spring in certain 
countries of the MENA region.   
Washington Consensus 
The Washington Consensus was a set of economic policies following a term introduced by 
the English economist, John Williamson, in 1989 and in response to the Latin American 
experience during the 1980s and 1990s.  Post-Allende Chile, in fact, was the first country in 
the 1970s, and well before Thatcher's Britain, that experienced the key tenets of Washington 
consensus (privatizations, liberalisation of financial and banking system, welfare cuts and so 
on). Latin American countries were struggling to overcome devastating debt crisis, triple digit 
hyperinflation and balance of payments problem. Government spending was very high, 
monetary and fiscal policies were unstable and the weak central banks were unable to 
control unsustainable credit expansions6. Export competitiveness was stifled by overvalued 
currencies and unsustainable exchange rate policies leading to ever-widening trade gap. 
The 1980s were the famous lost decade when Latin American countries experienced 
stagflation and decline in per capita income7. In light of the Latin American crisis the 
Washington Consensus formulated a set of policy agenda that were agreed by policy 
makers in Washington DC i.e. the U.S. Treasury, the IMF and the World Bank as a policy 
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basis for developing countries. The Consensus included a list of policy reforms shown in 
table 1. 
Table 1: The Original & Augmented Washington Consensus 
Original Washington Consensus “Augmented” Washington Consensus (original 
WC plus) 
 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance and institutional reform 
2. Redirection of public expenditure 
toward broad –based public sector 
provision 
 
12. Anti-corruption 
3. Tax reform- broadening of tax base and 
cutting marginal tax rates 
13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Financial and interest rate liberalisation 
 
14. WTO agreements 
5. Competitive exchange rates 15. Financial codes and standards 
6. Trade liberalisation 16. “Prudent” capital- account opening 
7. Liberalisation of inward FDI 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatisation of state enterprises 18. Independent central banks & inflation targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets particularly for the socially 
excluded 
10. Legal security for property rights 
targeting the informal sector 
20. Targeted poverty reduction through efficient 
social mechanism for allocating resources 
Source: Authors compilation of items from Rodrik (2006) and Williamson (2004) 
Broadly speaking the Washington Consensus advocated that governments should pursue 
economic reform through policies (a) that lead to macroeconomic stability through fiscal 
austerity and inflation control; (b) that encourage liberalisation of trade and capital account; 
(c) that promote privatisation and deregulation of domestic good and factor markets8. The 
Washington Consensus policies inspired a wave of reforms that significantly transformed the 
policy landscape in developing areas9. These reforms were introduced and propagated 
through IMF and World Bank Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes and have 
become the prominent orthodoxy in development since the 1990s. This was a completely 
new approach to development and constituted a complete shift in paradigm.  
Pre-Washington Consensus post war development approach was primarily based on 
Keynesian Economics whereby the state had a key role to play in the economy. Central 
5 
 
planning was considered the most efficient system of resource allocation not only in socialist 
economies but also in the developing economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Government control over domestic development was the underlying theme in most 
development models during that time namely Rostow’s stages of growth hypothesis, Paul 
Rosentein-Rodan’s big push industrialisation hypothesis, the Harrod Domar growth model 
and the Gunnar Myrdal circular and cumulative causation model10. Prescribed policies 
included import substitution, protection of domestic infant industry, direct involvement of the 
state in economic production and decision making, highly regulated financial and capital 
markets and restrictive trade and foreign investment policy.  This approach to development 
slowly died out in the late 1970s as a result of the poor economic performance of the 
countries that had embraced such state controlled policies. The failure of state 
interventionism to promote effective and sustainable growth caused a significant shift in 
paradigm in favour of ‘economic liberalisation’. Economic liberalisation focussed on reducing 
the size and control of the state, promoting privatisation and liberalising foreign trade. These 
policy prescriptions have their foundations in neo-classical economics which also forms the 
basis of the Washington Consensus. Thus the mantra of the Washington Consensus in line 
with neo-liberal orthodoxy was to “stabilise, privatise and liberalise’11.  
Neoliberal economists such as Lal, Little, Krueger and Bauer argued that market-led short 
term efficiencies would lead to long term growth. They believed that long term economic 
growth was the only way to achieve the key development goals of poverty reduction and 
welfare enhancement and that growth could be achieved through market driven economic 
policies by ensuring the most efficient allocation of resources. Empirical analysis reinforced 
his conviction that ‘market failure’ in itself did not justify government intervention and that 
‘bureaucratic failure’, more likely to be prevalent in less developed economies, would only 
make matters worse. He proposed the slogan ‘Get the prices right !’ and ardently opposed 
economic policy that encouraged ‘political pricing’ most commonly manifested in developing 
countries with artificially maintained high exchange rates, government controlled interest 
rates, subsidised agricultural products and import tariffs on luxury and consumer goods12. 
The concept of ‘poverty traps’ based on the notion that poverty and stagnation were self-
perpetuating and that foreign aid was the only way that the poorer economies could escape 
this trap was completely dismissed by Bauer and other neo-classical economists13. Implicit in 
the Washington Consensus was a structural approach to poverty eradication should be 
based on based on increased returns on factor endowments and increased capital 
accumulation. The argument was based on Heckscher-Ohlin’s (1933) Factor Price 
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Equalisation Theorem and Stopler-Samuelson Theorem that international trade liberalisation 
would raise returns to an abundant factor, which in most poor countries is unskilled labour.  
A comprehensive empirical study covering a period from 1970 to 2005 clearly indicates that 
countries that have embraced the trade liberalisation policy prescription of the Washington 
Consensus by lowering the tariffs on capital and intermediate goods have shown a 
significantly higher rate of growth than those where trade barriers remain14. The results 
validate the neoclassical growth model proposed by Robert Solow (1956) which states that a 
country starting off with a low per capita capital stock will experience faster rate of growth of 
per capita income as it approaches the steady state and will ultimately converge with the 
developed economies. Theoretical models suggests a mechanism where lower tariffs will 
lead to cheaper capital and intermediate goods imports resulting in accelerated growth rates 
in countries with low per capita capital stock. 
The proponents of the Washington Consensus believed that economic development would 
lead to an inverse U-shaped pattern of inequality as proposed by Kuznets15. Empirical 
studies conducted by Kuznets demonstrated that as a country developed inequality would 
initially increase, then peak and eventually start to decrease. This is because 
industrialisation would cause a significant urban-rural inequality gap initially. As more and 
more of the work force moved away from low paid jobs in rural areas in search of better job 
prospects in the urban areas inequality was expected to decrease. This dual economy 
dynamics would eventually lead to fairer distribution of wealth. Many empirical studies have 
been conducted to test the validity of the Kuznets curve. Williamson carried out a study of 
wealth inequality in Britain between 1823 and 1915 and found that it followed a pattern 
consistent to the Kuznets curve16. A similar trend for US wealth inequality data was found17. 
Empirical studies investigating European countries show that data from France, Germany 
and Sweden are consistent with Kuznets curve but other countries such as Norway and 
Netherlands demonstrate patterns of monotonically declining inequality from the mid-19th 
century18. However the pattern of inequality in most Latin American and South East Asian 
countries do not seem to follow the inverted U-shape of the Kuznets curve. Empirical 
evidence seems to be inconclusive highlighting the fact that not all development paths will be 
characterised by the Kuznets curve. These discrepancies may be due to the differing 
political factors and regional instabilities. In some cases countries development induces 
increasing inequality causing social unrest and forced democratisation. These countries will 
be more likely to encourage institutional reform and redistribution of wealth. However 
countries where development is linked to undemocratic paths show patterns inconsistent 
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with Kuznets either because development does not lead to rising inequality – the case of the 
‘East Asian Miracle’ or because of low levels of political mobilisation. 
Post Washington Consensus 
Although policy reforms propagated by the Washington Consensus were broadly embraced 
by Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA region and East Asia they have were unable 
to produce the desired results in majority of these countries. Per capita GDP growth in Latin 
America has been below expectations and short-lived, rising from 0.06% in the period 1975-
89 to 1.5 % in 1990-200119. During the same period the GDP per capita in Latin American 
has grown from -1.5 to -0.5%20. Moreover in 24 African countries the GDP per capita is less 
than 1975 level21. Although East Asian economies experienced high and sustained levels of 
per capita growth of 5.9 % in throughout the 1080s and 90s, since the financial crisis in 
1997-98 they have been widely condemned for their misguided economic policies22. 
Moreover transitional economies that embraced the policy reforms of the Washington 
Consensus experienced significant reductions in their GDP. The phenomenal growth of India 
and China since the 1990s highlights the fact that both followed the development paths 
significantly different from those proposed by the Washington Consensus23. 
Over the past decade the policy prescriptions proposed by the Washington Consensus have 
come under fire from many different quarters. The policy makers realised that the original list 
had a very narrow scope and focussed predominantly on macro and microeconomic policy 
reforms and did not feature any institutional reform24. This gave birth to the ‘Augmented 
Washington Consensus’ that included a list of reforms that were focused on institutional 
reforms (Table 1).  The realisation was that the stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation 
policy reforms would not be sustainable if institutional conditions were poor. Strong 
governance, rule of law, political equality, social justice and economic efficiency were the 
key elements to long term sustainable growth25. 
Critics of the Washington Consensus proposed an alternative development path that had 
broader goals and objectives. This has been termed by many policy makers as the ‘Post 
Washington Consensus’.  Stiglitz argued that the new consensus should include the broader 
development objectives of ‘sustainable development, egalitarian development and 
democratic development’26 
 The Post Washington Consensus neither represents a clear departure from fundamental 
values of the Washington consensus nor does it attempt to reproduce the same neoliberal 
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policy regime27. It is based on the concept of an ‘inclusive-neoliberal development regime’ in 
the global economy. This new consensus advocates that governments, and not the 
international financial institutions, should take the lead in both owning and directing the neo-
liberal policies. Proponents of the new consensus believe that giving the recipient 
government ownership is more likely to result in a genuine commitment towards 
implementing the structural adjustment policies as well as wider participation from civil 
society. Inclusive neo-liberalism can only succeed if public institutions are transparent, 
accountable and responsive. It is this kind of Post Washington Consensus path that should 
be the way forward in the Middle East. 
The MENA Region: Economic Performance and Challenges  
Following the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s and the subsequent balance-of-
payments crisis, some of the MENA countries adopted macroeconomic stabilisation 
programmes promoted by the World Bank, IMF and other western donors28. By the early 
1990s nearly all MENA economies followed suit. These structural adjustment programmes 
included neo-liberal reforms that were in line with the Washington Consensus guidelines. 
The objective was to promote growth and prosperity in the region by opening up the political 
economies and integrating them into global markets29. Pre-1990 development strategies had 
led to inward-looking, state led economic systems that were unable to compete in the global 
market. The economic fortunes of this region were, and still are, heavily reliant on rents 
derived from fuel exports, international aid and remittances resulting in volatile and 
unsustainable long term growth. Reforms were introduced to dismantle the system of 
centralised bureaucratic control and to promote a market-driven economy with a strong 
private sector and an increased focus on international trade liberalisation. This section of the 
paper will be concentrating on the impact of these reforms on the economic performance of 
this region. 
The MENA region may be characterised as one which holds massive hydrocarbon resources 
and yet suffers from low economic growth and development and high levels of 
unemployment30. Based on the availability of hydrocarbon resources and population size the 
World Bank (2007) has classified the countries within this region into the following three 
groups: 
 Resource-rich, labour abundant countries (RRLA) – this group includes countries that 
have high deposits of oil and natural gas and a large native population. Algeria, Iraq, 
Syria and Yemen fall into this category. 
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 Resource-rich, labour importing countries (RRLI) – the Gulf States of Bahrain, Qatar, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Libya fall into this group and 
are characterised as countries that have large expatriate populations and high 
reserves of hydrocarbon resources 
 Resource poor, labour abundant countries (RPLA) – this class includes small 
producers or importers of oil and natural gas – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordon, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Djibouti, and the Palestinian Authority fall in this group. 
Source: Authors calculations from World Bank database and DataStream 
 
Any analysis of the economic performance of this region will be done in the context of these 
three distinct groups in mind. 
 The economic performance in terms of GDP growth shows a positive trend in the MENA 
region, rising from 3.5% in the late 1990s to 6.3% in 2006 and 3.4% in 2011 (Table 2).  
Although there has been a significant improvement in the overall GDP growth in the region 
(pre-global recession 2007 and political turmoil in MENA 2010) the pattern of growth has 
been different for each of the separate groups. The major driver of growth has been oil 
Table 2: MENA Region Statistics  
Country 1996-1999 2000-2003 2004 2005 2006 2011 
MENA Region (excluding Iraq) average average 
   
 
Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 4.6 5.9 5.9 6.3 3.4 
CPI inflation (%) 4.2 2.8 4.1 5.5 5.3 12.3 
fiscal balance (%GDP) -2.8 1.5 6.8 11.8 14.5 2.1 
current account balance (%GDP) -0.1 7.1 11.0 16.9 20.7 11.0 
foreign direct investment (%GDP) 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.4 
      
 
Resource - poor, labour abundant (RPLA) 
     
 
real GDP growth 4.7 3.9 4.8 3.8 5.6 3.0 
CPI inflation (%) 3.3 2.3 4.0 7 5.8 7.2 
fiscal balance (%GDP) -3.9 -5.8 -6 -6.7 -6 -8.4 
current account balance (%GDP) -4 -1.5 -0.6 -1.6 -1.7 -8.6 
foreign direct investment (%GDP) 2.4 2.2 2.1 5.4 8.0 1.4 
      
 
Resource-rich, labour abundant (RRLA) 
     
 
real GDP growth 3.8 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.3 1.7 
CPI inflation (%) 12.6 9 10.5 9.4 8.7 10.5 
fiscal balance (%GDP) -0.9 1.8 2.5 4.6 3.1 -1.5 
current account balance (%GDP) 1.7 7.3 4.7 11.0 10.6 6.5 
foreign direct investment (%GDP) 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 
      
 
Resource-rich, labour-importing(RRLI) 
     
 
real GDP growth 3.3 4.7 6.9 7.5 7.5 3.8 
CPI inflation (%) 0.5 0.0 1.1 2.9 3.4 3.7 
fiscal balance (%GDP) -3.3 4.6 14.0 21.5 25.8 14.3 
current account balance (%GDP) 1.1 11.0 19.0 25.9 32.0 14.8 
foreign direct investment (%GDP) 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.3 1.9 
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revenues. The surge in GDP growth of the RRLI countries from approximately 3.3% in the 
late 1990s to nearly 7.5% in 2006 (Fig1) is due to soaring oil prices during this time period. 
RRLA countries also show significant increase in GDP between 1996 and 2003 and then 
seem to have stagnated. GDP of the RPLA countries dropped between 2000 and 2003 
however this group has shown signs of recovery since 2004, led mainly by Egypt. Egypt 
introduced a wave of new economic reforms in 2004 as part of SAP steered by the IMF. This 
has resulted in a phenomenal 6.8% growth in GDP in Egypt in 2006. The Egyptian policy 
makers have focussed on speeding up privatisation, creating new opportunities in 
manufacturing, construction and finance industries, contributing to the acceleration in 
industrial production to 3.4% in 2006 in the RPLA group countries. 
 
 
 
 
The Egyptian government has also reduced import tariffs and income tax thus boosting 
domestic consumption, which has been the main driving force behind Egyptian economic 
boom. FDI inflows rose from 0.3% of GDP in 2003 to 5.0 % in 2006 which is significantly 
higher than any other country in this RPLA group. The main findings of the studies carried 
out by World Bank demonstrate that GDP growth has been higher in those groups of 
countries, namely RRPI and RPLA, where there has been strong evidence of 
implementation of reforms in order to achieve better business environment31.        
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Fig 1: MENA GDP Growth 
1996-2011
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 Source: Authors calculation based on data collected from the World Bank Database and 
DataStream 
World Bank 2011b 
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Although the MENA region has experienced positive GDP growth rates since the mid-1990s 
this has not been reflected in the GDP per capita growth rates in the region. This is because 
the population has grown faster in this region than the GDP. Between 2000 and 2010 the 
annual average GDP growth rate was 4.8% however in the same the per capita GDP grew 
by only 2.5%.  
 
Source: Authors calculations based on World Bank and IMF-IFS data base. 
The gap between the GDP and per capita GDP in this region is very high, second only to the 
Sub-Saharan African region. This gap varies amongst countries in the MENA region, the 
widest being in Iraq, Yemen and UAE and narrowest being in Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon 
(World Bank Data).  
The overall fiscal position in the MENA region shows a vast improvement from a deficit of 
2.8% of GDP in 1996 to a surplus of 14.5% of GDP in 2006 mainly due to the large revenues 
from oil exports. However the surplus fell back to 14.3% in 2011 mainly due to the global 
recession post 2007 and the political turmoil in the MENA region since 2010.  
The growth in oil revenues from $180 billion in 2002 to $620 billion in 2007 (IDB) has mainly 
been due to the rise in oil prices and has led to huge increases in capital account and fiscal 
balances. The main driver of positive increase in fiscal balances within the region has been 
RRLI group with a fiscal balance of 25.8% in 2006. Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia have 
reported the largest surpluses in this group. The RRLA saw their fiscal balance deteriorate 
from 4.6% in 2005 to 3.1% of GDP in 2006 and further fall to -1.5% in 2011.RPLA has 
shown a slight improvement in fiscal deficit from -6.7% of GDP in 2005 to -6.0% in 2006 but 
0.0
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the intraregional trade pattern shows that RRLI (mainly GCC) countries tend to trade 
amongst themselves, where lack of product complimentarity is greatest, rather than with 
Maghreb countries. High transportation and communication costs are an impediment to 
intraregional trade. The difficult terrain in the Arab regions and lack of infrastructure increase 
trade costs. Geographically the Maghreb countries are closer to Europe than other Arab 
countries making it easier to trade with Europe. 
 
  
Although there has been a greater emphasis on trade reforms in recent years, tariff rates 
remain very high in the MENA region compared to anywhere else in the world (IDB).  
Egypt has introduced trade reforms in 2004 and 2007 to reduce tariffs from 17% to 6%. The 
strongest reformers in the region are Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The 
difference in tariff rates within the region is one of the main reasons for poor intra-MENA 
trade. 
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Fig 4: Manufactured exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports
Manufactured exports (% of merchandise exports) Exports (% of GDP)
Source:  World Bank 2011a 
Source: Authors calculations based on OECD 2011& UNCTAD 
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In general public sector salaries are higher than the private sector salaries in this region.   
Unemployment rates vary across the MENA region where the GCC countries have lowest 
rates of unemployment. However unemployment rates amongst GCC nationals is high as it 
employs a high proportion of foreign nationals. The unemployment rates in Egypt, Tunisia 
and Morocco have been around 10% over the past decade. Yemen, Algeria and The 
Palestinian Authority high witnessed very high rates of unemployment over the past decade.  
Unemployment figures in the MENA region can be slightly misleading as a very large 
percentage of the population works in the informal sector where wages are low, jobs are 
insecure and working conditions are very poor. Demographic changes in the MENA region is 
the main cause of such high unemployment rates amongst the youth in the region.                                             
The MENA region has vast endowments of human, financial and natural resources making it 
an economically significant player in the global market. A review of the recent developments 
and economic performance in the MENA countries show that overall GDP growth in the 
region between 1996 and 2006 has been steadily increasing. However the pattern of growth 
between RRLA, RRLI and RPLA countries vary significantly with oil revenues being the main 
driver of economic growth. The strong economic acceleration in the recent years has been 
matched by rapid increase in total population and the labour force. As a result the gap 
between GDP growth and GDP per capita growth has been increasing along with the 
unemployment rate. Unemployment is higher amongst graduates and the female population, 
and the region experiences large inter-regional labour movements triggering substantial 
financial flows in the form of workers’ remittances from abroad. Oil and oil-related products 
account for three quarters of the regions exports with the EU being the regions’ most 
important trading partner however there is very limited inter-regional trade. This is mainly 
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due to the poorly diversified export base of countries in this region. The region is also 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks mainly oil price and commodity price shocks. Oil price 
shocks directly affect the government revenues of oil exporting countries. As the region is a 
net importer of food and other non-fuel primary goods the recent rise in food and primary 
commodity prices has affected the current account balance, fiscal balance and inflation rates 
of most MENA countries adversely.  A large proportion of government revenues are spent on 
subsidising food and fuel prices. The region has limited integration with the international 
capital markets. Most of the foreign direct inflows accounted for in this region are accrued by 
the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia in particular. Portfolio investment is also insignificant, 
resulting in undercapitalised equity markets. Governments have realised that long term 
stable economic growth cannot be achieved without sustainable foreign investment and 
greater capital market integration34.  
 
 
 
Causes of the uprisings  
Social and political unrest still rumbles on in the Arab countries in transition (including Egypt, 
Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria and Yemen) two years after the Arab Spring 
uprisings started in December 201035. The political transitions in these countries can be 
characterised intense political and social unrest culminating in either regime change or a 
consolidation of power through political repression and income redistribution. In some 
countries within the MENA region political tensions remain high despite democratic 
transition. Although the patterns and demographics of the protests varied widely amongst 
the different countries the unifying purpose was to achieve personal dignity, human rights 
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and responsive government. However there has also been a strong economic rationale for 
the uprisings. A recent survey conducted in Egypt revealed that two thirds of the 
respondents identified either a lower level of inequality or provision of basic necessities for 
all citizens to be the essential characteristic of democracy36. I argue that the Arab uprisings 
have been fuelled by poverty, inequality, unemployment and lack of economic opportunity 
and if the transitional economies fail to address these concerns democracy will fail. But 
addressing this means reversing neo-liberal globalisation and moving towards a political and 
economic regime that goes beyond the deficiencies of both, the old, state-centric 
developmental model and that of neo-liberal globalisation and the Washington Consensus. 
Despite the neo-liberal reforms introduced the 1990s an arteriosclerotic state remains the 
most important economic player in the MENA region stifling out the scope for private-sector 
led sustainable economic growth. Gilbert Achcar describes the recent political turmoil in the 
MENA region as ‘revolutionary shock wave’ 37 and draws on Marxist ideology to explain its 
cause. He goes on to identify the main trigger to be the struggle between ‘relations of 
production’ and ‘productive forces’ thus leading to a general blockade in the region’s 
economic development. He describes in great detail the characteristics of Arab capitalism 
that is ‘politically determined’ rather than driven by ‘profit motive’ as in rational systems of 
capitalism. He argues that one of the main features of MENA capitalism are the ‘patrimonial’ 
( in most RRLA and RPLA countries) and ‘neo-patrimonial’ (in most RPLA countries) 
regimes that dominate the state. These patrimonial/neo-patrimonial regimes, in the absence 
of adequate legal systems and fuelled by corruption and nepotism, have given rise to ‘state 
bourgeoisie’ rather than what Achcar refers to as ‘free-market bourgeoisie’. This in turn 
along with rentierism and expansion of financial capitalism has caused investors to shy away 
from long term productive investment in this region resulting in stagnated economic growth 
and high unemployment.  
  Most countries in the MENA region rely on the state for food and energy subsidies and for 
employment in the public sector. This has led to has led to large fiscal burdens that the 
resource rich Arab nations have managed to balance with rents derived from fuel exports, 
resource poor Arab nations are heavily reliant on foreign aid and remittances to balance 
fiscal outlays. The MENA region has operated the subsidy system for the past 40 yrs and the 
current government spending on subsidies for the whole region is approximately $50 
billion38. This system however is inefficient and volatile and does not encourage human 
resource development or entrepreneurship or allow for poverty alleviation. The system 
perpetuates a social order that is preserved through repression and redistribution. However 
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the cost of redistribution has risen significantly due to escalating global food prices and the 
MENA regions’ massive reliance on food imports. Over 90% of food requirements of the 
GCC are imported39. The volatile fuel prices have also led to fiscal instability and high levels 
of inflation in the region.  
The state is still the largest employer in the MENA region. Public sector employment ranges 
from 22% of the work force in Tunisia to around 33-35% in Jordan, Egypt and Syria. People 
working in public sector receive high salaries, job security and other benefits that private 
sector is unable to deliver. Thus young graduates are attracted to public sector jobs where 
remuneration is not linked to skill or performance. This has resulted in a shortage of skilled 
workers in the private sector. Also there is a massive gap in the skills acquired by graduates 
at university and the skills required by business. This complete mismatch of skills is a major 
source of unemployment in the MENA region. As the labour force in this region is growing at 
a much faster rate than jobs created in the public sector the only way forward is reform the 
welfare and subsidy system and promote private sector led industrialisation. This has led to 
a tremendous amount of discontent amongst the youth of this region.  
The state in the region is an agent of neo-liberal globalisation, not an agent of reform for 
itself. Studies carried out by  the World Bank on the quality of public administration in the 
MENA region measures the efficiency of the bureaucracy, rule of law, protection of property 
rights, level of corruption, quality of regulations and mechanisms of internal accountability40. 
The findings of this study show that in terms of public sector accountability the region shows 
very high reform rankings indicating a positive change in the attitude of public sector 
institutions.  Public accountability measures transparency and openness of political 
institutions, public representation and participation, civil liberties and freedom of press. This 
may be explained partly by the conditional ties imposed by aid donors to be more 
transparent and open and partly due to the pressures from international trading partners and 
investors. 
The level of enterprise creation in in the MENA region is significantly lower than that in 
Europe and other OECD countries. Research by O’Sullivan et.al shows that on an average, 
approximately 2 new firms are set up for every 1000 working age people in Europe. In the 
MENA region this figure is considerably lower at less than 1 per 1000 working people. Time 
and again, this shows the level of weakness of the civil society in the region, which can be 
attributed to the weak private economic sector and, as a consequence, to the problematic 
institutional articulation between it and the state. 
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Conclusion 
The paper has tried to demonstrate that the economic success in the region has been mostly 
confined to the RRLI countries with vast reserves of hydrocarbon resources. These countries 
have been able to invest their fiscal reserves in infrastructure projects and in subsidising fuel 
and food prices. This group of countries have also been the able to attract considerable 
amount of investment from abroad. Economic success in RRLA countries has also been 
driven by fuel resources and remittances from abroad making them highly susceptible to 
international oil prices and labour market fluctuations. The economic performance of the 
RPLA countries has been heavily reliant on foreign aid and labour remittance from abroad. 
Tied in with the aid and investment are conditions imposed by donor countries and 
institutions insisting on structural changes in goods, labour and capital markets. These 
conditions impose restrictions on the size and role of the governments in these countries. 
Evidence over the past couple of decades shows that these structural changes have been 
implemented in the MENA countries at different rates and with different degrees of success. 
The state still remains the dominant economic player in this region and the Arab population 
still regards it as the primary provider. The state has been able to hold on to its power by 
limiting the role of private enterprise and also by maintaining an exclusive nexus between 
the state and the few prominent private sector companies. 
My research also shows that the Arab uprisings are linked to the inequalities created by the 
opening up of the Arab countries to foreign capital and financial agencies, a project that is 
commonly called as Washington Consensus. This neo-liberal globalisation programme has 
been highly diverse in its effectiveness throughout the MENA region. Although the wave of 
disillusionment and frustration amongst the Arab youth washed over the entire region with 
the same passion and propensity, the reaction of individual governments has been very 
varied. The RRLI and RRLA (with the exception of Libya and Syria) countries, namely the 
GCC governments followed the road of appeasement, promising more economic 
concessions in the form of more jobs, higher wages and low food and fuel prices. It is 
interesting to see that negligible political concessions have been made. In the RPLA 
countries of Egypt and Tunisia the political change has been more radical and drastic with 
very few economic reforms. The resource rich governments have been able to control the 
uprising through economic concessions and in some cases intimidation whereas the 
resource poor governments have not been able to make such economic promises and 
despite military deployment have fallen in the face of these uprisings. 
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The future of the region lies in how effectively and efficiently the interim or newly elected 
governments are able to implement the political and economic changes they have promised 
in their election manifestoes, and how able they will be to move their country beyond the 
pincers of, on the one hand, the Washington Consensus and, on the other, the old, state-
centric and inefficient developmental regime.  
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